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Abstract
To characterize money in a static economic model, it is known to be important to consider the agent-
commodity double-innity settings, i.e., the overlapping-generations framework. There does not seem
to exist any papers, however, treating the axiomatic characterization problems for such monetary
Walras allocations under the social choice and/or mechanism design settings. We show that the
monetary Walras allocation for the economy with double innities is characterized by weak Pareto-
optimality, individual rationality, local independence or the monotonicity conditions of social choice
correspondence among the allocation mechanisms with messages under the category theoretic approach
in Sonnenschein (1974). We utilize Sonnenschein's market extension axiom for swamped economies that
is closely related to the replica stability axiom of Thomson (1988). We can see how these conditions
characterize the price-money message mechanism universally among a wide class of mechanisms, and
eciently in the sense that it has the minimal message spaces (price-money dictionary theorems).
Moreover, by using the category theoretic framework, we can obtain the up-to-isomorphism uniqueness
for such a dictionary object (isomorphism theorems).
Keywords : Resource Allocation Mechanism, Social Choice Correspondence, Overlapping-Generations
Economy, Monetary Walras Allocation, Local Independence, Monotonicity, Informational Eciency,
Universal Mapping Property
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1 Introduction
To introduce money in a static general equilibrium model, the overlapping-generations model with the
double innity of commodities and agents is known to be the most fundamental framework. The model was
rstly introduced by Samuelson in 1958 (Samuelson 1958). It generated various discussions because of its
outstanding feature that competitive equilibria may not necessarily be Pareto-optimal. Although Samuelson
characterized the role of at money as a certain kind of social contract that leads to Pareto improvement,
his argument was not accurate enough. In the 1970s and the 1980s, many papers on monetary general
equilibria make certain that the existence of at money may not necessarily cause Pareto improvements
nor necessarily assure the existence of monetary equilibria that may or may not be Pareto-optimal (see,
for example, Shell 1971, Hayashi 1976 and Okuno and Zilcha 1980). Moreover, a monetary equilibrium
is unstable from the cooperative game theoretic viewpoint (Esteban 1986) as well as from the viewpoint
of equilibrium dynamics (Gale 1973). The only armative result that we have for a characterization
of equilibrium in overlapping-generations economies with money is the relation between weakly Pareto-
optimality and valuation equilibrium (see Balasko and Shell 1980 and Esteban 1986).
Recently, the authors presented a replica nite core equivalence and characterization for the mone-
tary Walrasian correspondence under the overlapping-generations framework and provided an axiomatic
characterization for it.1 Except for our works, however, there do not seem to exist papers treating such
axiomatic characterization problems for the double-innity monetary equilibrium allocations under the so-
cial choice and mechanism design settings. In this paper, we treat this problem through the setting of the
allocation mechanism with messages like Sonnenschein (1974), Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974),
Osana (1978) and Jordan (1982). In order to facilitate a typical innite dimensional treatment for mes-
sage for message spaces on this problem, we especially follow the strongly structured response-function
approach in Sonnenschein (1974) and Sonnenschein's market extension axiom for swamped economies
which is closely related to the replica stability axiom of Thomson (1988) and Nagahisa (1994) for the
social choice framework. We show that the monetary equilibrium allocation and the price-money message
mechanism are possibly characterized axiomatically by using well-known social choice theoretic normative
criteria, especially the local independency and the monotonicity, through the category theoretic approach
of Sonnenschein (1974).
Theorem 1 shows in the domain of double innity exchange economies, sucient and/or necessary rela-
tions between the social choice correspondence satisfying the property of weak Pareto-optimality (WPO),
individual rationality (IR), the local independence (LI) and the correspondence that allocate for each eco-
nomy its monetary Walrasian equilibria, the monetary Walrasian correspondence. Based on this knowl-
edge, Theorem 2 asserts that every allocation mechanism with messages whose equilibrium results are
compatible with the three conditions, WPO, IR and LI, can universally and uniquely be identied with
a part of monetary Walrasian (price-money) message mechanism. We can also obtain Theorem 3 that
assures the uniqueness of such a message space as a solution to the universal mapping problem. Theorem 4
and 5 show that the price-money dictionary theorem (Theorem 2) and the isomorphism theorem (Theorem
3) can also be obtained through the monotonicity instead of the local independency.
1 See Urai and Murakami (2015a) and Urai and Murakami (2015b).
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2 The Model
As in our previous paper (Urai and Murakami 2015b), we dene the general overlapping-generations
settings under the duality between R1 and R1. Since we are concerned with one shot (perfect foresight)
equilibrium states, this kind of overlapping-generations model (one good for each period and (`(t) + 1)-
periods lifetime-span for each generation t) is suciently general to include all types with `-goods and
n-periods lifetime for each generation t.2
We denote by N the set of all positive integers and by R the set of real numbers. An overlapping-
generations economy, or an economy, E, is a list of:
(OG1) fItg1t=1; a countable family of mutually disjoint nite subsets of N such that
S1
t=1 It =N ,
where It 6= ; for each t 2N . It is the index set of agents in generation t.
(OG2) fKtg1t=1; a countable family of non-empty nite intervals, Kt = fk(t); k(t)+1;    ; k(t)+`(t)g
where k(t) and `(t) are elements of N such that
S1
t=1Kt = N and k(t)5 k(t + 1)5 k(t) + `(t) for
all t 2N , and ft j n 2 Ktg is nite for each n 2N . Kt is the index set of commodities available to
generation t.
(OG3) f(%i; !i)gi2St2N It ; countably many agents, where %i is a rational weak preference on the
commodity space, RKt , of i 2 It for t 2N . Every preference, %i, can be represented by a continuous
utility function, ui : R
Kt ! R, that is strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotonic. The initial
endowment of i, !i, is an element of R
Kt
++ = fx j x : Kt ! R++g for each i 2 It.
The commodity space for each generation, RKt+ , can be recognized as the subset of R
N, the set of all
functions from N to R, by identifying x 2 RKt+ with the function that takes value 0 on NnKt. The total
commodity space for an economy is, therefore, the set of all nite sums in RN among points in commodity
spaces of some generations, 1t=1RKt+  RN. Clearly, 1t=1RKt+ can also be identied with a subset of the
direct sum, R1, the set of all nite real sequences, which is a subspace of the set of all real sequences,
R1  RN.
Given an economy, E = (fItg1t=1; fKtg1t=1; f(%i; !i)gi2St2N It), the price space for E, P(E), is dened
as the set of all p in RN+ such that under the duality between R1 and R
1, p evaluates all agents' initial
endowments positively, i.e.,
P(E) = fp 2 RN+ j p  !i > 0 for all i 2 It, for all t 2Ng:(1)
Since for all i 2 It, !i 2 RKt++, for all t 2 N , the price space of E always includes RN++ for all E in Econ,
the set of all economies satisfying conditions (OG1), (OG2) and (OG3).
For each E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ, sequence (xi 2 RKt)i2St2N It is called an allocation for
E. An allocation (xi 2 RKt)i2St2N It is said to be feasible ifX
t2N
X
i2It
xi =
X
t2N
X
i2It
!i;(2)
where the summability in RN of both sides of the equation is assured by (OG2). The list of a price vector
p 2 P(E), a non-negative wealth transfer function ME : N =
S1
t=1 It ! R+, and a feasible allocation
2 With respect to the topological structure for this kind of double innity economies, we also use the simplest case of
the duality between the direct limit of nite dimensional commodity spaces and the inverse limit of nite dimensional price
spaces (see Aliprantis et al. 1989, Urai 1990 and Urai 1994), which is equivalent to treating the duality between R1( R1)
and R1 under the ordinary product topology.
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(xi 2 RKt)i2St2N It is called a monetary Walras allocation for E, if for each t 2 N and i 2 It, xi is a
%i-greatest element in the set fxi 2 RKt j p  xi5 p  !i +ME(i)g (see, e.g., Balasko and Shell 1981 and
Esteban and Millan 1990). We denote the set of all monetary Walras allocations byMWalras(E).
An allocation, x, for economy E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ is said to be weakly Pareto-optimal
(WPO), if there is no y with the property
P
t2N
P
i2It yi =
P
t2N
P
i2It xi, yi = xi except for a nite
number of i, and yi%i xi with at least one strict preference i for i 2
S
t2N It.
3 Moreover, we say that
allocation x is individually rational (IR) if xi%i !i for all i 2
S
t2N It.
Social choice correspondence g on domain Econ is a correspondence that assigns some allocations for
each E, g : Econ 3 E 7! g(E)  RN. Let K(s) = Sst=1Kt and I(s) = Sst=1 It for each s 2 N . We say
that social choice correspondence g satises the condition of local independence (LI) if x 2 g(E) implies
x 2 g(E0) whenever E is (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g), E0 is (fItg; fKtg; f(%0i; !i)g), %0i = %i except for nite
agents, and if there exists s 2 N such that I(s) includes all such nite agents and a unique supporting
hyperplane Hs  RK(s) at x 2 g(E) of every better set fyij yi i xig of i 2 I(s) also supports every
fyij yi 0i xig of i 2 I(s).4 Social choice correspondence g is said to satisfy the condition of monotonicity
if x 2 g(E) implies x 2 g(E0) whenever E is (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g), E0 is (fItg; fKtg; f(%0i; !i)g),
%0i = %i except for nite agents, and there exists s 2N such that I(s) includes all such nite agents and
every better set fyij yi i xig at x of i 2 I(s) includes fyij yi 0i xig of each i 2 I(s).5
3 A Preliminary Theorem
Social choice correspondence g : Econ! RN is said to be monetary Walrasian if g(E) =MWalras(E).
We have the next theorem that characterizes the monetary Walrasian social choice correspondence through
the LI condition.
Theorem 1 (LI Characterization Theorem)6 : (i) Assume that social choice correspondence g is WPO
and IR. If g satises LI and all better sets of i 2 I(s) at x 2 g(E) are supported by a unique price p in
RK(s), then for all i 2 I(s), their initial endowments are evaluated less than or equal to the value of xi
under p. In particular, if g satises LI and all better sets of agents at x 2 g(E) is supported by a unique
price, x is a monetary Walras allocation (g is monetary Walrasian). (ii) On the other hand, monetary
Walrasian social choice correspondence g is WPO and IR valued, and if the non-negative wealth transfer
ME does not depend on the preferences of agents, it satises the LI condition.
Proof : Assume that an allocation x 2 g(E) is WPO and IR, and social choice correspondence g satises
the LI. By the weak Pareto-optimality, we have a price, p 2 R1, such that for each i 2 S1t=1 It, x0i i xi
implies that p  x0i > p  xi (Balasko and Shell 1980). If p  xi= p  !i for all i, by dening ME(i) as
p  xi   p  !i 2 R+, we can identify x as a monetary Walras allocation. Hence, the latter part of the
assertion (i) follows from the former. Suppose that for some i 2 I(s), p  xi < p  !i and all better sets of
i 2 I(s) at x are supported by a unique price p 2 RK(s). Then, it is possible to change the preference
3 See Balasko and Shell (1980).
4 See Nagahisa (1991).
5 It is obvious that the above monotonicity is weaker than the local independence condition as long as we ignore the
probably inessential condition of the existence of a unique supporting hyperplane at allocation x. The local independence
condition, however, enables us to obtain a simple characterization of monetary Walrasian allocation in the next section
(Theorem 1).
6 To obtain an analogous result based on the monotonicity, we need Axiom S in the next section.
3
of i to 0i so that 0i satises !i 0i xi and all assumptions in (OG3), and p remains to be a supporting
hyperplane of the better set of i under 0i at x. Under the LI, x should be in the value of the social choice
for such an economy, which is impossible, however, since !i 0i xi contradicts the IR.
On the other hand, monetary Walras allocation is obviously IR and is well known to be WPO (see
Balasko and Shell 1980 and Esteban 1986). Moreover, for each allocation x 2 g(E) having a unique
supporting hyperplane Hs 2 RK(s) for better sets of agents in I(s) for some s 2 N , we can conrm
that the monetary Walrasian social choice correspondence g satises the LI. Indeed, as long as each non-
negative wealth transfer does not depend on preferences, any preference changes from economy E to E0
to check the LI condition do not aect the property of allocation x to be agents' individual price-wealth
maximands. 
Note that in the denition of LI, the uniqueness property of the supporting hyperplane for better sets
of agents at allocation x of g is important. The LI condition does not say anything for allocations that do
not have this uniqueness property. For dierentiable class of economies (treated in section 4 Theorem 3),
the uniqueness property is satised at every allocations.
4 Axiomatic Characterization of the Price-Money Message Mech-
anism
Three conditions in Theorem 1, the weak Pareto-optimality (WPO), the individual rationality (IR),
and the local independence (LI), enable us to provide an axiomatic characterization of the monetary
Walrasian (price-money) message mechanism through the category theoretic framework as in Sonnenschein
(1974). We formulate, especially, the local independence condition and, interchangeably, the monotonicity
condition as axioms for such allocation mechanisms.
At rst, we reformulate the concepts in Sonnenschein (1974) into the social choice settings. A WPO-IR
compatible social choice correspondence associates with each economy E a set of allocations which are
WPO and IR allocations for E. An allocation mechanism with messages in our model or an (abstract)
message mechanism based on such a social choice correspondence, g, is a triple, (A;; f): the set A is a
message domain,  is a correspondence which indicates for each economy E the set (E)  A of equilibrium
messages for E, and f is a function which denes for each agent, i, and each message, a, the response,
f i(E; a), of the agent to the message, satisfying that g(E) = f(f i(E; a))1i=1 j a 2 (E)g.7 The list of
equilibrium responses associated with a 2 (E) assigns to each agent in E his response to the message a.
The monetaryWalrasian social choice correspondence associates with each economy the monetaryWalras
allocations of the economy. The standard message mechanism is such that A = RN+  fM jM : Econ !
RN+ g, (E) is the set of equilibrium prices with non-negative wealth transfer of E, and f gives the excess
demand function of each consumer relative to price-money messages. Let us consider the following axioms.
Axiom S (Sonnenschein) : For each nite list of the economies and the members, (i1;E1), (i2;E2), : : : ,
(im;Em), each message a 2 A and each list of responses (fis(Es; a))ms=1, there exists an economy E
including fi1; i2; : : : ; img such that a is an equilibrium message for E satisfying that the equilibrium list,
(fi(E; a))1i=1, is an extension of (fis(Es; a))
m
s=1.
7 For this concept, Sonnenschein (1974) uses the word private representation. The word \private," however, is not appro-
priate for our setting, since the responses of agents to the messages are partly dependent on the economy.
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The above condition is closely related to the replica stability axiom of Thomson (1988) (see Urai and
Murakami 2015b). Note that since the non-negative wealth transfer may be dierent among agents having
the same individual characteristics, it would be desirable to treat general messages that are partly economy-
dependent.8 Hence the nite agents in the previous axioms should be listed with the economies to which
they belong.
The following axioms redene the local independency and the monotonicity conditions in the previous
section through the terms in the allocation mechanism with messages.
Axiom L (Local Independency) : For each economy E and message a, if there exist generation s 2 N
and a unique hyperplane Hs  RK(s) that supports the better set at fi(E; a) of every i 2 I(s), then for
each economy E0 having the same indices of agents and commodities, endowments and possibly dierent
preferences of agents in I(s) of economy E, such that Hs is also a supporting hyperplane of the better set
at fi(E; a) of every i 2 I(s), we have f(E; a) = f(E0; a).9
Axiom M (Monotonicity) : For each economy E and message a, if s 2 N and E0 is an economy having
the same indices and endowments of agents in E together with the same preferences except for agents in
I(s) such that every better set at fi(E; a) in E includes the better set at the same point in E
0 for each
i 2 I(s), then we have f(E; a) = f(E0; a).
Consumer i is a pair (%i; !i), where %i and !i satisfy the conditions in (OG3). We assume in the
following the commodity structure, fKtg1t=1, is xed, and identify the set of all economies, Econ, with
the set of those in Econ with the commodity structure fKtg1t=1. Denote by I(t) the set of all agents in
generations from 1 to t, i.e., I(t) =
St
s=1 Is, and by K(t) the set of all commodities that are available for
agents in I(t), i.e.,K(t) =
St
s=1Ks. For each t, by 
K(t), we denote the unit simplex inRK(t) and by 
K(t)
++
its relative interior,R
K(t)
++ \K(t). Let us consider projective system (K(t
0)
++ ; %t0t)t0;t2N and projective limit
++ = lim  (
K(t0)
++ ; %t0t), where %t0t : 
K(t)
++ ! K(t
0)
++ is dened as %t0t(p) =
prK(t0) p
k prK(t0) pk . Note that ++ can
be recognized as a subset of R1++ by identifying the equivalence class [(x
t)1t=1] of (x
t)1t=1 2
Q1
t=1
K(t)
++
with the element p 2 R1++ such that prK(1) p = x1 and
prK(t) p
k prK(t) pk = x
t for all t = 2; 3; : : :. We take
the price and non-negative wealth transfer domain as P M = fp 2 R1j 9[(xt)1t=1] 2 ++; prK(1) p =
x1;
prK(t) p
k prK(t) pk = x
t; for each t = 1; 2; : : :gfM jM : Econ 3 E 7!ME 2 RN+ g. The excess demand function
of the i-th consumer, (%i; !i), in E 2 Econ is dened as ei : PM 3 (p;M) 7! ei(p;ME) 2 R1, where
ei(p;ME) is the %i-greatest point in fxi 2 RKt j p  xi5 p  !i +ME(i)g, for each i 2 It and t 2N .
Dene e : Econ  (P M) ! R1 by e(E;%i; !i; p;M) = (ei(p;ME)i2It)t2N. If for each E 2 Econ,
(E) denotes the set of all price-money equilibrium messages, then (PM; ; e) is a message mechanism
based on WPO-IR compatible social choice correspondence MWalras(E). It is called the price-money
message mechanism. Note that (PM; ; e) does not satisfy Axioms S and L.10
8 In the sense that the message is related not only to each agent's characteristics, i.e., the initial endowment and the
preference, but also to their places in the economy to which they belong.
9 It is possible to weaken Axiom L by restricting the condition to the messages satisfying a 2 (E) as long as we use
the axiom with Axiom S. From the viewpoint of independency among axioms, it is desirable to dene axioms L and M as
conditions not on equilibria but merely on responses. Note that if Axiom L is satised, the sub-correspondence of a social
choice correspondence g that is dened by the set of allocations under g of E relating to a certain message a 2 (E) as its
responses, also satises the LI condition.
10 For Axiom L, see (2) of Theorem 1. For Axiom S, see footnote 7 of Urai and Murakami (2015b).
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Theorem 2 (Price-Money Dictionary Theorem under Axiom L) : If (A;; f) is a message mechanism
based on WPO-IR compatible social choice correspondence g, and if (A;; f) satises Axioms S and L,
then (i) there exists a unique function  : A ! P M, such that the following triangle commutes, and
(ii) on (A)  PM, the price-money message mechanism satises Axioms S and L.
R1 
6
1Econ  
Econ  (PM)
Econ A
e
f
@
@
@I
Proof : (i) Assume that (A;; f) is a message mechanism based on g satisfying Axioms S and L, and let a
be an element of A. Dene for each t 2N , h(t)(x;%i) for each consumption x 2 RKs for agent i 2 Is  I(t)
of an economy E 2 Econ as h(t)(x;%i) = fp 2 K(t)j y i x implies p  y= p  xg, where every RKs is
canonically identied with a subspace ofK(t). We rst show that
T
h(t)(fi(E; a);%i) is non-empty for each
t 2N , where the intersection is over all consumers and economies in Econ, and fi(E; a) is a response of i 2
I(t) in E to message a in (A;; f). Because K(t) is compact, and because each of the sets in the collection
from which we are forming the intersection is closed, it is sucient to show that
Tm
s=1 h
(t)(fis(Es; a);%is) is
non-empty for any [(i1;E1); (i2;E2); : : : ; (im;Em)]. Given the list [(i1;E1); (i2;E2); : : : ; (im;Em)] of agents
in I(t) and economies, by Axiom S there exists E 2 Econ containing fi1; i2; : : : ; img and a 2 (E),
such that the equilibrium list, (fi(E; a))1i=1, is an extension of (fis(Es; a))
m
s=1. Because (fi(E; a))
1
i=1 is
an element of g(E), the allocation is weakly Pareto-optimal, so by Balasko and Shell (1980) and Esteban
(1986), it is supported by a price as a price-wealth equilibrium, and thus
Tm
s=1 h
(t)(fis(Es; a);%is) is non-
empty. Moreover, because for some economy and its agents,
T1
t=1 h
(t)(fi(E; a);%i) is singleton and is an
element of 
K(t)
++ , it follows that
T
h(t)(fi(E; a);%i) is composed of a single point p(t).
By denition of h(t), we have p(t0) = %t0t(p(t)) for all t05 t, and obtain a unique element p 2 P by
identifying it with the unique element of the projective limit lim  
Tm
s=1 h
(t)(fis(Es; a);%is)  ++. Let
us denote that point, p, by 1(a), and dene 2(a) = M , M : Econ 3 E 7! ME 2 RN, as ME(i) =
1(a)  (fi(E; a) !i), which will be proved as non-negative in the following by Axioms S, L and Theorem
1. Let (a) be (1(a); 2(a)) 2 PM. In order to establish the theorem, it is sucient to show that for
each economy E 2 Econ and a 2 A, an allocation y = (yi )1i=1 = (fi(E; a))1i=1 is such that for each
i, yi = fi(E; a) satises ME(i) = 
1(a)  (fi(E; a)   !i)= 0. Fix a member i of E. By using Axiom
S, let E be an economy including i such that a is an equilibrium message for E and the response
yi = fi(E; a) is equal to y

i = fi(E; a). Without loss of generality we can assume that E has, at
least to the generation s of member i, one consumer in each generation whose supporting hyperplane for
any better set at their individually rational point is unique.11 We show that response y = f(E; a) is
a monetary Walras allocation. This allocation is IR and WPO. Moreover the social choice rule dened
by a and its responses for all economies in Econ having the same indices of agents in E satises the LI
condition by Axiom L (see footnote 9). So by (i) of Theorem 1, the allocation belongs toMWalras(E).
(ii) One can observe in the above argument, y = f(E; a) = e(E; (a)) is a monetary Walras
allocation, which proves that Axiom S is satised on (A). Moreover, it is straightforward that the
11 It is always possible to add nite agents in constructing economy E in Axiom S.
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commutativity of the diagram with Axiom L for (A;; f) means that Axiom L is satised on (A). 
By Theorem 2, from every message mechanism (A;; f) based on WPO-IR compatible g satisfying
Axiom S and L , there exists a unique price dictionary function,  : A ! P M. In other words, the
results of such message mechanisms can be realized universally and eciently through the price-money
message mechanism (PM; ; e). Thus we have obtained the price-money dictionary theorem as in our
previous paper (Theorem 2 of Urai and Murakami 2015b: based on WPO and nite core compatible g).
We can also obtain an isomorphism theorem for the price-money message mechanism (Theorem 3 of
Urai and Murakami 2015b) as follows. Denote by PML the set of all (p;M) 2 PM which is an image
of  for some (A;; f) in Theorem 2 satisfying Axioms S and L. The following axiom on the dependence
of monetary messages on the economic structure is necessary to show the second assertion.
Axiom D (Dependency on the Economic Structure) : If E = (fItg1t=1; fKtg1t=1; f(%i; !i)i2St2N Itg) and
E0 = (fI 0tg1t=1; fK 0tg1t=1; f(%0i; !0i)i2St2N Itg) are such that fItg1t=1 = fI 0tg1t=1, fKtg1t=1 = fK 0tg1t=1 and
!i = !
0
i for all i 2
S
t2N It, then ME = ME0 for all M 2M.
Theorem 3 (Isomorphism Theorem under Axiom L) : Consider the restriction of price-money message
mechanism (PML; ; e). Let (P
0; 0; e0) be a message mechanism based on WPO-IR compatible social
choice correspondence g on Econ. If (P 0; 0; e0) satises Axioms S and L, and if, for every message
mechanism (A;; f) satisfying Axioms S and L, there exists a unique mapping 0 : A ! P 0 such that
f(E; a) = e0  [1Econ0](E; a), then (i) there exists an isomorphism (bijection) h0 such that h0 : PML !
P 0 and e = e0  [1Econ  h0]. (ii) Moreover, assume that monetary messages satisfy Axiom D. If we
can restrict the problem on spaces with topological (resp. on each inverse-system component space with
dierentiable) structures and continuous mappings (resp. dierentiable coordinate mappings), then the
isomorphism can be taken as the homeomorphism (resp. dieomorphism for each component space).12
Proof : Because (PML; ; e) is now assumed to be a message mechanism based on WPO-IR compatible
social choice correspondence g satisfying Axioms S and L, we have the next diagram by assumption.
(R1)N 
6
1Econ  0
Econ  P 0
Econ PML
e0
e
@
@
@I
Moreover, because (P 0; 0; e0) is also a message mechanism based on social choice correspondence g, the
previous theorem shows that we have the next diagram.
12 In this paper, the price-money message space has been treated as an inverse limit of nite dimensional domains of
coordinate functions of e. The dierentiability for e and a dierentiable structure on its domain, however, is appropriate to
be treated on each of its coordinate functions, ei, whose domain is always possible to be identied with a nite dimensional
subspace of PM  PML. More precisely, under the denitions of e = (ei)1i=1 and e0 = (e0i)1i=1 with Axiom D, the bijection
h0 gives an algebraic isomorphism between the domain of ei and e0i for each i, to which the dieomorphism argument can
be applied. We can construct (as a subspace of PML under the identication of R1  R1) a direct limit of the nite
dimensional projection, Pt, of the domain of (ei)i2I(t) for each t 2 N, so that the bijection h0 gives an algebraic isomorphism
between the domains Pt of (ei)i2I(t) and P 0t of (e0i)i2I(t) for each t. In this sense, each restriction of h
0 gives a dieomorphism
between the direct systems, (Pt)1t=1 and (P
0
t )
1
t=1.
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(R1)N 
6
1Econ  
Econ PML
Econ  P 0
e
e0
@
@
@I
Since the identity mapping is the unique mapping for P 0 to P 0 satisfying e0 = e0  id and PML to PML
satisfying e = e  id, we have 0   = id and   0 = id, which means that  and 0 are bijectives. Let us
dene h0 as h0 = 0, then we have the rst assertion.
For the second assertion, for each (p;M) 2 PML, for each economy E 2 Econ and for each generation
t, consider two agents is and js, s = 1; : : : ; t such that e = (   ; ei1 ;    ; ej1 ;    ; ei2 ;    ; ej2 ;   ) on PM
is one to one, continuous and/or dierentiable.13 Then, the continuity (resp. dierentiability) at (p;M)
of h0 will be ensured by the continuity (resp. dierentiability) of e and e0. 
Hence, Theorem 3 asserts that if we restrict the domain of the price-money messages to where Axioms
S and L are satised, the price-wealth formed monetary message mechanism is essentially the only object
having the above universality and eciency as a solution to the universal mapping problem.
The above price-money dictionary theorem (Theorem 2) and the isomorphism theorem (Theorem 3) can
also be obtained through the monotonicity axiom (Axiom M) instead of the local independency axiom
(Axiom L).
Theorem 4 (Price-Money Dictionary Theorem under Axiom M) : If (A;; f) is a message mechanism
based on WPO-IR compatible social choice correspondence g, and if (A;; f) satises Axioms S and M,
then (i) there exists a unique function  : A ! P M, such that the following triangle commutes, and
(ii) on (A)  PM, the price-money message mechanism satises Axioms S and M.
R1 
6
1Econ  
Econ  (PM)
Econ A
e
f
@
@
@I
Proof : (i) We can repeat the argument in the rst paragraph in the proof of Theorem 2 and obtain
the single point p(t) in
T1
1=1 h
(t)(fi(E; a);%i)  K(t)++ . Also by denition of h(t), for all t05 t, we have
p(t0) = %t0t(p(t)), and obtain a unique element p 2 P by identifying it with the unique element of the
projective limit lim  
Tm
s=1 h
(t)(fis(Es; a);%is)  ++. Let us dene 1(a) as this unique element, p, and
13 If generation s 2 f1; : : : ; tg of E consists of a single member, alternatively consider an economy E^ including all members of
generations 1;    ; t of economy E such that every generation s 2 f1; : : : ; tg consists of at least two members and (p;M) is the
equilibrium message of E^ by Axiom S. To obtain a concrete example for such a one-to-one, continuous and/or dierentiable
mapping, take a pair of Cobb-Douglas and Leontief utility agents for each generation. Note that the Leontief-type utility is
not dierentiable, but the demand function induced from it can be dierentiable.
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dene 2(a) = M , M : Econ 3 E 7! ME 2 RN, as ME(i) = 1(a)  (fi(E; a)   !i), which will be proved
as non-negative in the following by Axioms S and M.
Let (a) be (1(a); 2(a)) 2 P M. To establish the theorem, it is sucient to show that for each
economy E 2 Econ and a 2 A, an allocation y = (yi )1i=1 = (fi(E; a))1i=1 is such that for each i,
yi = fi(E; a) satises ME(i) = 
1(a)  (fi(E; a)  !i)= 0.
Assume the contrary, that is, that there is a member i of E such that at yi = fi(E; a) we have
1(a)  (fi(E; a)   !i) < 0. By using Axiom S, let E be an economy including i such that a is an
equilibrium message for E and the response yi = fi(E; a) is equal to y

i = fi(E; a), and there is at
least one agent j 6= i such that i and j are in the same generation s and the supporting hyperplane at
fj(E; a) for the better set of j is unique (that is necessarily equal to 1(a)).
Fix the indierence surface of i in E at yi = y

i = fi(E; a) and change the preference of i to what
is obtained through the homothetical transformation of the surface at yi , -
0
i.
14
Consider the economy E0 such that the preference of i in E is replaced with -0i. By Axiom M,
fi(E
0
; a) = y

i . Change the preference of i to -^
0
i so that -^
0
i satises !i-^
0
iy

i and y

i 6 -^
0
i!i and all
assumptions in (OG3), and 1(a) remains to be a supporting hyperplane of the better set of i under -^
0
i
at yi . Moreover, consider the homothetical transformation of the preference of i by using the indierence
surface at yi of -^
0
i, and call it -
00
i . Let us denote by E
00
 the economy where we replace the preference -0i
of i with -00i .
By Axiom S, we have an economy E including i in E00 and j in E, and a is an equilibrium message
for E. Since 1(a) must support the better set of j at fj(E; a) by WPO, fi(E00; a) must be dierent
from yi by the condition IR, but must be equal to some point zi at which the indierence surface of the
point is supported by 1(a). That is, fi(E
00
; a) = zi 6= yi = fi(E0; a). This is a contradiction since
fi(E
0
; a) is equal to fi(E
00
; a) under Axiom M.
(ii) Repeat the arguments in the proof (ii) of Theorem 2 (replace Axiom L with Axiom M). 
Denote by PMM the set of all (p;M) 2 PM which is an image of  for some (A;; f) in Theorem 4
satisfying Axioms S and M.
Theorem 5 (Isomorphism Theorem under Axiom M) : Consider the restriction of price-money message
mechanism (PMM ; ; e). Let (P
0; 0; e0) be a message mechanism based on WPO-IR compatible social
choice correspondence g on Econ. If (P 0; 0; e0) satises Axioms S and M, and if, for every message
mechanism (A;; f) satisfying Axioms S and M, there exists a unique mapping 0 : A ! P 0 such that
f(E; a) = e0 [1Econ0](E; a), then (i) there exists an isomorphism (bijection) h0 such that h0 : PMM !
P 0 and e = e0 [1Econh0]. Moreover, (ii) assume that monetary messages satisfy Axiom D and the set of
all economies, Econ, consists of those having commodity structure fKtg1t=1 and include at least two agents
for each generation. If we can restrict the problem on spaces with topological (resp. on each inverse-system
component space with dierentiable) structures and continuous mappings (resp. dierentiable coordinate
mappings), then the isomorphism can be taken as the homeomorphism (resp. dieomorphism for each
component space).
14 Let U(yi ) be the indierent surface at y

i of i. Under the IR, y

i 6= 0. By the strict monotonicity, U(yi ),  > 0 covers
the RKs+ . Moreover for each x 2 RKs+ , there exist (x) such that x 2 (x)U(yi) and such (x) is unique under the strong
monotonicity. Thus by dening u(x) as u(x) = (x), we have the preference, -0i, satisfying all the conditions in (OG3).
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Proof : Repeat the proof of Theorem 3 (replace Axiom L and PML respectively with Axiom M and
PMM ). 
5 Conclusion
We have thus obtained two kinds of price-money dictionary theorems (Theorem 2 and 4) and the
isomorphism theorems (Theorem 3 and 5). It can be said that the price-money dictionary theorem, which
asserts that the price-money message mechanism can be referenced uniquely and universally among the
category satisfying the axioms in question (a property for itself ), together with a restriction of price-
money messages to the place where all such axioms are satised (a property on itself ), enables us to
show the isomorphism theorem which says that the price-money message mechanism can be characterized
as an essentially unique mechanism (up to isomorphism between the message spaces) in the category of
allocation mechanisms with messages satisfying those axioms.
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